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Barring some shock that seriously rearranges the legal
landscape, a salient development in the years ahead will be
an intensified focus on the adequacy of state post-conviction review systems. If state and federal policy makers
perform their respective roles appropriately, this development will prove to be good news for the entire criminal
justice system.
To be sure, an omnipotent policy maker facing a blank
computer screen might consider abolishing state post-conviction review altogether. Perhaps petitioners’ relatively
low success rate might not justify the costs in money and
case-resolution time that those proceedings consume. Perhaps one might split the resources instead between
improvements in the state trial and direct appeal system
and the federal habeas corpus regime.
But we have no omnipotent policy makers and we are
not typing on a blank screen. State post-conviction review
is not going away.
The states have sound reasons for not abandoning
their systems of collateral attack. Historically such systems
have proved their value as protectors of liberty at least
from the time of conflicts over slavery before the Civil
War. Practically they provide convenient fora for the examination of claims (e.g., ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence) that would be awkward to examine as part of the
initial proceedings. Indeed the experimental efforts of
some large states in recent years to set up unitary review
processes in order to speed up cases, particularly capital
cases, have proved to be a resounding failure.1
From the viewpoint of the federal government, quite
apart from whatever genuine weight officeholders may
give to notions of comity, the more work that is done at the
state level, the less needs to be done at the federal level.
These considerations have previously led me to urge
the Supreme Court to articulate a constitutional right to
counsel in capital state post-conviction proceedings2 and
to suggest that the states should proceed down this path in
advance of the Court.3 That body is slated to render a decision in the area during 20124 in a non-capital case where
the petitioner raises a disturbing issue. Under state law
his only opportunity to assert his undoubted Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial5 is

in a state post-conviction proceeding. But since he is not
provided an effective lawyer there to assert the claim and
since the federal courts will nonetheless consider the
claim defaulted if not properly presented there,6 how is
the state to be held to its Sixth Amendment duty?
Regardless of the Court’s answer, it has already made a
decision during 2011 that insures that the adequacy of
state post-conviction proceedings will be a centrally contested issue in the years ahead.
In Cullen v. Pinholster7 the Court construed Section
2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which bars federal habeas relief
in many circumstances unless the state courts’ adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.” It ruled that the federal habeas
petitioner seeking to meet this threshold burden was limited to the record of the state court proceedings and was
not entitled to a federal hearing until he had crossed the
threshold. Critically, however, the holding was limited to a
context in which petitioner did not contest the fact that he
had been given a full and fair opportunity to develop the
claim in the state post-conviction proceedings.
Had the fact been otherwise the ruling would certainly
have been otherwise as well. Textual constructions of various parts of AEDPA would have provided the rationale,8
but all would have occurred in the shadow of the powerful
canon that a statute should be construed so as to avoid
plausible doubts as to its constitutionality.9 And if AEDPA
were construed so as to deny a petitioner one full and fair
opportunity to attack the constitutionality of his conviction
in some court it would be unconstitutional under a line of
cases stretching back a century or more10 as well as more
recent precedent under the Suspension Clause.11
Moreover, the Court has in the past few years again
made clear that once a state creates a state post-conviction
system, that system must provide due process or be subject to a structural attack under Section 1983.12
Stepping back, then, and taking the policy maker’s perspective, the path ahead is clear enough.
The incentives for states to have robust systems of
post-conviction review have increased. If the states create
such systems the federal courts will treat their individual
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outcomes with greater respect than before, but if the states
do not create such systems the failure is more vulnerable
to structural attack than before.
The federal government’s interests, both in enforcement of the Bill of Rights and in the reduction of its own
courts’ workloads, lie in the direction of insuring full
examination of each petitioner’s federal constitutional
claims at the state post-conviction level.13 For example, if
a state summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition
pleading facts that if true would warrant relief the federal petitioner is entitled to a federal court hearing,
which would not be the case if the state adjudicated the
factual merits.14
Those states that have not already done so (and a number have15) should provide for effective assistance of
counsel on state post-conviction review as the simplest
method of responding to the new pressure to ensure that
their systems provide a full and fair opportunity for the
litigation of prisoners’ constitutional claims. From the
states’ viewpoint, the law regarding effective assistance of
counsel is well-established and government-friendly. Any
attempt to meet their due process obligation by some
other means is extremely unlikely to succeed, just as no
system of pro se representation, however many resources
it provided, could realistically fulfill the state’s due process
obligation to furnish counsel at a criminal trial.16
It is easy to see how a state might provide lawyers
and still maintain an unfair post-conviction system (e.g.,
by denying discovery), but it is hard to see how a state
might maintain a fair post-conviction system and not
provide lawyers.
The federal government for its part does itself no
favors by lax enforcement of the states’ obligations to provide meaningful state post-conviction proceedings. On the
contrary, it only imposes on itself the burden of taking up
the slack.
The confluence of pressures now centered on state
post-conviction proceedings could yield genuine benefits to
the entire criminal justice system and all of its stakeholders.

If the state and national governments each discharge their
duties responsibly, the federal system will be working as it
should: efficiency will be furthered while at the same time
“a double security arises to the rights of the people.”17
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